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Insurability of Losses Resulting from
Liability Under the Federal Securities
Laws
GEORGE C. MONTGOMERY*
BRUCE M. THORNTON**
A number of years ago, one of the nation's leading authorities on
securities law wrote an article for the ABA's Forum which warned of
the increasing exposure of financial institutions to liability under the
federal securities laws.' The accuracy of Professor David Ruder's pre-
dictions has been illustrated in a number of recent securities fraud cases
involving staggering sums of money.' Modem securities fraud actions
tend to involve an ever increasing number of defendants, many of
whom had only a peripheral connection with the primary wrongdoers,
but who may nevertheless be jointly liable under the expanding scope
of the federal securities laws. The expansion of such liability has re-
sulted to a large degree from the supplementation of the federal stat-
utes by common law principles of derivative liability, a trend which
* J.D., 1959, Loyola University of Los Angeles. Admitted to California and U.S. Tax
Court. Senior Partner with Montgomery, Bottum, Regal & McNally, Los Angeles.
** B.A., summa cum laude, 1973, University of Texas; J.D., 1976, University of California
at Los Angeles. Partner with Montgomery, Bottum, Regal & McNally, Los Angeles.
1. Ruder, Increasing Danger of Loss for Financial Institutions Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 8 FORUM 323 (1972).
2. Perhaps the most publicized example is the litigation resulting from the collapse of the
U.S. Financial real estate empire, in which nearly 100 defendants, including a number of major
banks, were sued for several hundred million dollars. See In Re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, 75
F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Ca. 1977). The settlements in this case have exceeded those in any previous
securities litigation. The contribution of one of the defendant banks, together with its legal fees
and disbursements, exceeded $25 million.
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owes no small part of its impetus to the commentaries of Professor
Ruder.3
Many defendants in securities fraud actions can be expected to look
to their insurance carriers for protection from the enormous expense of
defending such an action and from any resulting liability. This article
deals with the insurability of losses resulting from liability under the
federal securities laws. Although it will focus primarily on fidelity
bond coverage for such losses, its analysis is not restricted to any partic-
ular type of indemnity bond or policy, and the conclusions reached
would be applicable to any contract of indemnification against loss or
liability. Owing to the scarcity of case law in this area, the discussion
will be based largely on analogous authority. On the basis of this au-
thority, the article will conclude that it is against public policy in cer-
tain circumstances to permit indemnification for a loss arising from
liability for a violation of federal securities laws.
SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
The most familiar provision of the federal securities laws is Rule
lOb-5,4 promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission (herein-
after referred to as S.E.C.) pursuant to the authority of section 10b of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 Section 10b prohibits the use of
any "device, scheme or artifice to defraud" in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities.6 Rule lOb-5 is an umbrella provision
which covers most of the activities prohibited elsewhere in the 1934
Act, as well as many which are not included within the ambit of the
much narrower Securities Act of 1933.7 An analysis of the types of
activities which can constitute a violation of the federal securities laws
is beyond the scope of this article.8 This article will focus on the ele-
ments necessary to establish secondary liability for such violations.
Secondary liability, as distinguished from primary liability, may be de-
fined as liability which is vicarious or derivative, and results either
from a special relationship with one primarily liable or from the tan-
gential degree of participation in the violation.
3. See Ruder, Multoile Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding andAbetting, Con-
spiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnfcaion and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972), which
has been quoted and relied upon in numerous decisions.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
5. 15 U.S.C. §78b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
6. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(a) (1981).
7. See 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
8. This subject is covered inAffiliated Ute Citizens v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128 (1972) and SEC v.
Texas GulfSuphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally A. BROMBERO, SECURITIES
LAW (1977).
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4. The Inclusive Position
The particular type of secondary defendant with whom this article is
primarily concerned is an employer (including a corporation or other
business enterprise), which is sought to be held vicariously liable for a
securities violation committed by an officer, employee or agent. Under
familiar principles of agency law, the plaintiff has essentially two alter-
native theories for establishing the liability of the employer. The first
theory, based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, imposes abso-
lute liability on an employer for the torts committed by his employee
within the scope of his employment.' A closely analogous rule imposes
liability on a principal for the torts of his agent committed within the
scope of the agency. The second theory of recovery is based upon the
doctrine of apparent (or ostensible) authority, which imposes absolute
liability based upon the principal's manifestation to third persons as to
the agent's authority to act for the principal in the transaction.1" Both
of these legal theories impose liability upon the employer without re-
gard to the employer's own fault or culpable participation. The view
that these twin common law principles of vicarious liability are to be
incorporated into the framework of the federal securities laws is some-
times referred to as the "inclusive" position.
B. The Exclusive Position
In recent years, a number of courts have squarely rejected the inclu-
sive position, and have held that an employer or principal cannot be
held liable for the violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws by an employee or agent unless the employer or princi-
pal was a knowing and culpableparticipant in the fraud." These courts
have concluded, on the basis of the legislative history of the 1933 and
1934 Acts, that Congress intended to exclude common law rules of vi-
carious liability which impose liability without regard to fault.'2 This
position, known as the "exclusive" viewpoint, is based upon the "con-
trolling persons" provisions of the Acts. Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act
imposes liability upon every person who exercises control over a viola-
tor "unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not di-
rectly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action."'13
9. Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976).
10. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
11. See, e.g., Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975); Zweig v.
Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973).
12. See 479 F.2d at 1299; 527 F.2d at 884-85.
13. 15 U.S.C. §78t (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The controlling persons provision of the 1933
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The distinction between the absolute liability under agency law and
liability under Section 20(a) is that, under the latter, the controlling
person has a "good faith" defense. The courts which adhere to the
exclusive viewpoint hold that the controlling persons provisions are the
exclusive method of imposing liability upon an employer for the securi-
ties violations of an employee.' 4
C The Requirement of "Culpable Participation"
A controlling person is any person or entity who exercises a direct
means of discipline or influence short of actual direction over the viola-
tor.15 An employer or corporation will uniformly be held to be a con-
trolling person with respect to an employee or officer except in those
rare instances in which the officer or director occupies such a position
of ownership or power as to be the controller of the corporation. How-
ever, because of the existence of the good faith defense of Section 20(a),
a controlling person is not liable unless he was guilty of "culpable par-
ticipation" in the fraud.1 6 In Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades,17 for
example, Rhoades, an officer-director of defendant M.S. & R. Corpora-
tion, was alleged to have committed a Rule lOb-5 violation in failing to
disclose material information in connection with a purchase of the cor-
poration's stock from plaintiff. In holding M.S.&R. was not liable for
the conduct of Rhoades, the Third Circuit stated:
The legislative history of Section 20(a) illustrates that Congress in-
tended liability to be based on something besides control. That
something is culpable participation.'
We hold. . that secondary liability cannot be found under §20(a)
Act (Section 15, 15 U.S.C. §77o) exonerates a controlling person if he "had no knowledge of or
reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts. . ." constituting the violation of the
controlled person. There is very little case law dealing with Section 15, because most plaintiffs
prefer to proceed under the more sweeping 1934 Act. The prevailing view appears to be that
Section 15 is to be interpreted similarly to Section 20a. Jackson v. Bache & Co., Inc., 381 F. Supp.
71, 94 n.12 (N.D. Ca. 1974) (stating that the two provisions are "treated identically"). Yet Section
15 has also been interpreted as imposing only a standard of reasonable care, at least where the
primary violation requires only negligence. DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841-42 (2d Cir.
1968). The following analysis is based on Section 20a, and although it is believed to be applicable
to Section 15 as well, the foregoing reservations should be kept in mind.
14. The legislative history of the controlling persons provisions which forms the basis of the
inclusive-exclusive schism is too complex to permit a meaningful discussion in this article. See
generally Comment, The Burden of Controk Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) ofthe Securl.
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019 (1973); Comment, The Controlling Persons
Provisions: Conduits of Secondary Liability Under Federal Securities Laws, 19 VILL. L. REV. 621
(1974); Comment, Vicarious Liabilityfor Securities Law Violations: Respondeat Superior and the
Controlling Persons Sections, 15 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 713 (1974).
15. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975).
16. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973). This decision coined the
phrase "culpable participation."
17. 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
18. Id. at 884-85.
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unless it can be shown that the defendant was a culpable participant
in the fraud. Liability may be established whether the secondary de-
fendant was directly or indirectly involved in the fraud... and may
be premised on inaction, but only if it is apparent that the inaction
intentionally furthered the fraud or prevented its discovery ... In-
action alone cannot be a basis for liability. We found that M.S.&R.
had no knowledge of Rhoades' fraudulent acts and did not 'con-
sciously intend' to aid Rhoades in his fraudulent scheme. The appel-
lant would have been required to show that the defendant's inaction
was deliberate and done intentionally to further the fraud.' 9
In Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,2° Campbell, a financial columnist and em-
ployee of Hearst Corporation, wrote an article which was published in
a Hearst newspaper. The article touted the stock of a certain corpora-
tion but failed to disclose that Campbell had recently purchased stock
in that corporation. Immediately after publication of the article, the
stock rose dramatically, Campbell sold his holdings, and the stock then
declined. Plaintiffs, shareholders of a corporation merging with the
company whose stock was touted, sued Campbell and Hearst under the
Rule lOb-5.
The District Court granted Hearst's motion for summary judgment,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.2' It observed that Section 20(a) was the
exclusive method of imposing liability upon Hearst and rejected the
argument that such liability could be based on principles of agency law
or on the failure of Hearst to adequately supervise Campbell.22 The
court stated:
Some lesser standard amounting more nearly to culpability is indi-
cated. A newspaper which requires its reporters to report facts fairly
and accurately has a right initially to expect compliance. Unless
somehow placed on notice that a particular writer has violated or
may violate the requirement of fairness and accuracy, the newspaper
may continue to safely anticipate compliance. 2
3
A number of the exclusive courts have recognized an exception to the
requirement of culpable participation where the secondary defendant is
a securities broker or dealer. In order to satisfy the requirement of
good faith, it is necessary for a broker-dealer to show that precaution-
ary measures were taken to prevent the violation, and that adequate
supervision was maintained over the violating employee.2' This test,
19. Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
20. 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
21. Id at 1136.
22. Id. at 1132.
23. Id. at 1135. See also Zweig v. Hearst, 54 N.C. L. REv. 488 (1976).
24. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980). The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, recently rejected this view, holding that a brokerage firm is not liable for its em-
PaciFc Law Journal / V. 13
frequently referred to as the "broker-dealer precautionary-supervisory
standard," is essentially a negligence standard, and its applicability
turns solely on the distinction between brokerage firms and other types
of business enterprises. According to the exclusive viewpoint, however,
businesses other than broker-dealers have no duty to institute precau-
tionary measures or to supervise their officers or employees to prevent
securities fraud.
Although the Supreme Court has been afforded a number of oppor-
tunities to resolve the inclusive-exclusive split, it has chosen not to do
so. At the present time, the inclusive position has been adopted by the
Fourth Circuit,25 the Fifth Circuit,2 6 the Sixth Circuit27 and the Sev-
enth Circuit.2 8 It has also been advocated by the S.E.C. in administra-
tive rulings.29 The exclusive position has been adopted by the Second
Circuit,3" the Third Circuit,3' the Ninth Circuit,3 2 and arguably also the
Eighth Circuit.3 No definitive position has been taken by the First or
Tenth Circuits.
The courts which have adopted the exclusive viewpoint, however,
clearly enjoy the more prestigious reputation in the area of federal se-
curities laws. The Second, Third and Ninth Circuits have decided the
great majority of securities fraud cases, probably owing to their prox-
imity to the nation's major securities exchange centers, and have long
been regarded as the pioneers in this area of the law. Their position
should accordingly carry considerable weight when this issue comes
before the U.S. Supreme Court.
THE STANDARD OF CULPABILITY OF A CONTROLLING PERSON
No precise definition of the term "culpable participation" has been
formulated by the courts. However, it appears that a plaintiff seeking
to overcome the good faith defense of Section 20(a) must demonstrate
that the controlling person had knowledge of the fraud of the con-
ployee's securities fraud unles the firm was a "culpable participant." Christoffel v. E. F. Hutton &
Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1978).
25. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
26. Lewis v. Walston & Co., Inc., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
27. Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. S.E.C., 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. den., 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
28. Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir., 1974).
29. Cady, Robertson & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
30. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit has
permitted the use of agency law in S.E.C. enforcement proceedings, though. S.E.C. v. Manage-
ment Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975).
31. Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades 527 F.2d 880, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit
has approved the use of agency law in the context of broker-dealers, but has rejected such an
argument with regard to other business entities. Thomas v. Duraite Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 577, 586
n.4 (3d Cir. 1970).
32. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
33. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967).
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trolled person and was guilty of affirmative conduct or inaction which
substantially facilitated the commission of the violation.
There existed for many years a split among the courts as to whether a
violation of Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 could be based upon mere
negligence or whether the plaintiff was required to prove scienter. In
the landmark decision of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,34 the Supreme
Court held that such a violation can be based only on a finding of sci-
enter, which it defined as "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."3
The Court observed that various provisions of the federal securities
laws predicate liability on various states-of-mind which fall into three
categories: intentional, negligent and innocent. The Court based its
holding in part upon a number of analogous provisions of the 1934 Act
which it concluded demonstrate a requirement of intent to defraud.
One of these provisions was Section 20(a). The Second and Third Cir-
cuits, which had advocated a scienter requirement for liability under
Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 even prior to Hochfelder, have also con-
cluded that the standard of culpability under these provisions should
be included in Section 20(a).36 A leading commentator has suggested
that Hochfelder by implication requires such an interpretation of Sec-
tion 20(a).37
The requirement of culpable participation has also been analogized
to the common law doctrine of aiding and abetting. The court in
Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades pointed out that this doctrine is an
alternative method of imposing liability on an employer for the viola-
tions of an employee. The elements of aiding and abetting are: (1) an
independent violation by a third party; (2) knowledge of the violation
by the defendant; (3) knowing and substantial assistance and participa-
tion by the defendant in the violation.38 In the context of an employ-
ment relationship, the evidence necessary to establish aiding and
abetting has been stated to be the same as that necessary to overcome
the good faith defense under Section 20(a).39
Although the Supreme Court in Hochfelder declined to consider
34. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
35. Id. at 193.
36. 479 F.2d at 1305-06; 527 F.2d at 888-89.
37. See generally Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977). See also
Comment, The Controlling Persons Liability of Broker-Dealers, 1974 DUKE L.J. 824, 842 (1974),
stating that a findin of bad faith under Section 20(a) requires scienter, and that the only differ-
ence between the scienter requirement under Rule lOb-5 and the good faith defense is a shift in
the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant seeking to establish the defense. Accord,
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).
38. See note 17 supra. See also Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793
(3d Cir. 1978).
39. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779 (3d Cir. 1976) (not an
appeal from the case cited at note 37 supra).
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whether reckless conduct is sufficient to satisfy the scienter require-
ment, numerous prior and subsequent decisions have recognized the
sufficiency of recklessness to establish a violation.40 However, the pre-
vailing view is that the finding of recklessness is not in itself equivalent
to scienter, but rather merely evidence from which the factflnder can
infer scienter. As stated in Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas,4
"Knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence or by reckless
conduct, but the proof must demonstrate actual awareness of the
party's role in the fraudulent scheme."42
The standard of culpability necessary to overcome the good faith de-
fense of a controlling person has nothing to do with the schism between
the inclusive and exclusive courts, though. The inclusive courts as well
as the uncommitted courts which have analyzed Section 20(a) have in-
terpreted the good faith defense consistently with the exclusive courts.43
The distinction between the inclusive and exclusive positions is simply
that, under the former view, an employer cannot escape liability merely
by establishing his good faith, but must also negate his liability under
the principles of agency law.
To briefly summarize, then, an employer - whether an individual,
partnership, corporation or other business entity, other than a securities
broker - is not liable for the federal securities violations of an em-
ployee in the courts following the exclusive position unless the em-
ployer was a culpable participant in the fraud. In order to be a
culpable participant, he must have had knowledge of the fraud and
rendered substantial assistance in its perpetration. The question which
now arises is whether a loss resulting from such liability is compensable
under a fidelity bond, or other form of indemnity insurance.
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INTENTIONAL ACTS OF INSURED
A broad form fidelity bond generally insures against loss to the in-
sured caused by employee fraud or dishonesty, and has been inter-
preted as providing coverage for a loss sustained by reason of the
liability of the insured to a third party arising from employee fraud.44
40. See Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978); 479 F.2d at 1306.
41. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 96, citing A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: Fraud §85(582) (1974)).
43. See SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Rich-
ardson v. McArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 42 (10th Cir. 1975).
44. See generally Jefferson Bank & Trust Co. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 408 S.W.2d 825
(Mo. 1966). In 1976, the definition of fraud and dishonesty in the Form 24 Bankers Blanket Bond
was modified. Coverage is now provided only where the employee acted with the manifest intent
to cause the loss to the insured, or to obtain a financial benefit for himself or another. This new
provision should not provide a defense to the insurer in a significant percentage of cases in which
the insured is held liable to a third party.
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It also appears to be settled, though, that such a loss is covered only if
the liability of the insured is vicarious, that is, based upon principles of
agency law which impose absolute liability without regard to fault. In
Levey v. Jamison,45 one of the most well-known fidelity bond cases
dealing with what may be referred to as a "corporate act" defense, the
court remanded the case for further evidence as to whether the alleged
embezzler acted with the knowledge and assistance of other high-level
officers of the corporation, stating:
It is manifest if the jury should find that the corporation itself was a
party to the acts complained of, there can be no recovery in this case.
The parties to the bond did not mean to insure the corporation
against losses which might be caused by its own dishonesty or crime,
but merely to protect it against the dishonesty or crime of its employ-
ees. A policy of fidelity insurance does not insure an employer
against its own fraud.46
No attempt will be made in this article to analyze the numerous cases
dealing with this defense. A considerable discussion of these cases ap-
pears in Montgomery, The Alter Ego Type Defenses Reconsidered.47 A
comparison of the factual setting of the cases discussed in the above
article will reveal, upon close analysis, that the very conduct on the part
of the insured necessary to render it liable under the controlling per-
sons provisions of the federal securities laws will operate to prohibit
recovery under a fidelity bond or other indemnity insurance agreement.
The majority of the federal securities fraud cases in which liability
has been imposed on a corporation under controlling persons provi-
sions have involved one or more wrongdoers who were either high-
level officers or directors whose acts by virtue of their domination of
the corporation were considered to be the acts of the corporation itself
and thus sufficient to defeat the good faith defense.48 Other cases have
involved violations by an ordinary employee or agent which were com-
mitted with the knowledge of high-level officers of the corporation.49
Compare these cases to fidelity bond cases in which recovery was de-
nied on the basis of the insured's participation in the fraud: West
American Finance Co. v. Pac'fc Indemnity Co.,50 where the wrongful
acts were committed by the controlling officers and directors; or First
45. 82 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1936).
46. Id. at 960. See also First National Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 514 F.2d 981 (8th Cir.
1975); Phoenix Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 427 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1970).
47. 13 FoRuM 528 (1979). See also Skillern, When Dishonesty by Officers of Insured Becomes
Dishonesty of Insured to Preclude Recovery Under Fidelity Bond, 5 FORUM 235 (1970).
48. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); S.E.C. v. Lum's, Inc., 365
F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (acts of wrongdoers considered "corporate acts"); cf Reeder v.
Mastercraft Electronics Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
49. See Richardson v. McArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971).
50. 17 Cal. App. 2d 225, 61 P.2d 963 (1936).
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National Bank of Sikeston v. Transamerica Ins. Co." 1 where various
high-level officers silently condoned the president's check-floating
scheme. Compare the analysis of the imputed knowledge doctrine in
the fidelity bond case of Phoenix Savings & Loan Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co."5 with that of the securities fraud case of Gould v. Ameri-
can Hawaiian S.S. Co." The legal principles upon which the courts
have relied to impose liability under Section 20(a) are the same as those
which have long been the basis for denying indemnity under fidelity or
indemnity insurance coverage.
It is the thesis of this article that a loss resulting from liability under
the federal securities law should not be and is not compensable under
any circumstances if the insured was held liable in a court following the
exclusive viewpoint.54 The mere fact of such liability should estop the
insured in the subsequent action against the insurer from relitigating
the issue whether the insured knowingly participated in the fraud.5 5 If,
on the other hand, the insured was held liable in an inclusive forum, 6
the subsequent liability of the insurer should depend upon whether the
insured's liability was based on principles of common law vicarious lia-
bility or upon a controlling persons provision. If the insured's liability
was based upon both concepts, or upon the controlling person provi-
sion alone, the loss should not be compensable. If the insured settled
the third-party action prior to a final judgment the loss should not be
compensable if the litigation occurred in an exclusive forum and the
legal theory for recovery advanced was a federal securities act
violation.
INDEMNIFICATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
Analogous authority for this position may be found in decisions
holding that an agreement of indemnity which purports to indemnify a
corporation for a willful violation of the securities laws is void as
against public policy. For this purpose, three leading decisions will be
analyzed.
51. 514 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1975).
52. 427 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1970).
53. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
54. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
55. The use of defensive collateral estoppel by a stranger to the prior action is well estab-
lished. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 326
(1970).
56. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
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A. Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.
In Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,57 a corporate underwriter
was held liable to a third party under provisions of both the 1933 and
1934 Acts. Such liability was necessarily based upon knowledge of
misrepresentations made by its codefendant, the corporate issuer, in the
offering circular. The underwriter sought indemnification from this co-
defendant under the terms of an express indemnity agreement. The
District Court refused to allow indemnity, stating:
It would be against the public policy embodied in the federal securi-
ties legislation to permit [the underwriter], which has been found
guilty of misconduct in violation of the public interest involving ac-
tual knowledge of false and misleading statements or omissions and
wanton indifference to its obligations and the rights of others, to en-
force its indemnification agreement.
If an underwriter were to be permitted to escape liability for its own
misconduct by obtaining indemnity from the issuers, it would have
less of an incentive to conduct a thorough investigation and to be
truthful in the prospectus distributed under its name, than it would
have if the indemnity was unenforceable under such circumstances.
58
The Second Circuit, in affirming the holding, approved of this rea-
soning and added the following remarks:
[I]t is important to emphasize at the outset that at this time we con-
sider only the case where the underwriter has committed a sin graver
than ordinary negligence.
[T]o tolerate indemnity under these circumstances would encourage
flouting the policy of the common law and the Securities Act. It is
well established that one cannot insure himself against his own reck-
less, willful or criminal misconduct.5 9
The decision in Globus was based in part upon the position of the
Securities Exchange Commission that indemnification of directors, of-
ficers and controlling persons against liability arising under the 1933
Act is against public policy.
Although Globus provides strong support for the position suggested
in this article, it is technically distinguishable from a case in which the
liability of the insured was based on a controlling persons provision.
Globus was decided prior to the time the inclusive-exclusive schism de-
57. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a f'd inpart and rev'd inpart, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
58. 287 F. Supp. at 199. Compare this language with that of the Supreme Court in
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 209 n.28, which stated that Section 20(a) "contains a state-of-mind condi-
tion requiring something more than negligence."
59. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969).
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veloped, and neither of the opinions in the case discussed the concep-
tual basis of the liability of the underwriter, stating merely that the
corporation had knowledge of the fraud of its president. Although it
appears clear that the corporation would have been liable under Sec-
tion 20(a), the opinions did not mention this provision.
B. DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.
Another leading decision in this area is DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum
Co.,6 which illustrates the distinction between permitting indemnity
where liability is merely vicarious and permitting it where liability is
based upon fault. Empire Corporation and its controlling stockholder-
director, Stone, were sued for a Rule lOb-5 violation. Both defendants
cross-complained against a third party seeking indemnification in the
event they were held liable. The District Court dismissed Stone's cross-
complaint because any finding of liability on the part of Stone would
necessarily require a finding that he "knowingly participated in the
fraud." The court refused to dismiss Empire's cross-complaint, reason-
ing that Empire's liability, if any, would be based only on principles of
agency law rather than knowing participation.61 These rulings were
not contested in the subsequent appeal.
The reasoning in Degaas is precisely why the defense suggested in
this article might fail if the liability of the insured were established in a
forum following the inclusive position (unless, of course, liability was
also predicated on a controlling persons provision). In an exclusive
court, on the other hand, in which agency principles are unavailable to
impose secondary liability, indemnification should be disallowed be-
cause the liability of the indemnitee, like that of Stone, would necessar-
ily be based on knowing participation in the fraud.
C Seiffer v. Topsy's Intern., Inc.
However, a federal district court considering the same question
posed in DeHaas reached a contrary conclusion. In Seiffer v. Topsys'
Intern., Inc.,62 a class action was brought against a corporate issuer,
Topsy's, together with three of its high-level officers and its accounting
firm. The action, brought under Section l0b and Rule lOb-5, was
based upon alleged nondisclosures by the corporation and its account-
ants in connection with a prior corporate acquisition. Topsy's and its
officers settled with the plaintiffs and brought an action for implied and
60. 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
61. See DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1968).
62. 487 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan. 1980).
1982 / Znsurability of Losses
express indemnity against the accounting firm to recover the amount of
the settlements and defense costs. The court, relying on Globus, denied
indemnity, stating:
Plaintiffs' claims, which Topsy's [and its officers] settled, were for
fraud; the attorneys' fees expended were in defense of allegations of
fraud. The anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act, which served as the
basis of plaintiffs' claims against these defendants, require miscon-
duct more serious than negligence, that is, recklessness or willful mis-
conduct. 'It is well established that one cannot insure himself against
his own reckless, willful or criminal misconduct.' In the context of
securities laws violations, an indemnification agreement would be
unenforceable. 63
Since Seiffer was decided by a court from within the Tenth Circuit,
which still follows the inclusive viewpoint, Topsy's could have been
held vicariously liable for the fraud of its officers and therefore should
have been permitted to maintain an indemnity action under the reason-
ing of the Tenth Circuit decision in DeHaas. The significance of Sef-
fer is its suggestion that the public policies underlying the federal
securities laws might supercede technical distinctions between primary
and vicarious liability of the indemnitee. If so, indemnity might be
prohibited in an inclusive as well as in an exclusive jurisdiction.
D. The Future of Indemnity Clauses After Globus
Globus has been followed in cases dealing with a variety of factual
situations and different types of defendants. 64 The decision was highly
praised by the commentators, a number of whom argued that Globus
had not gone far enough. One observer predicted "that ultimately in-
demnity provisions, even as applied to cases of negligence rather than
willful misconduct, will be held to be violative of public policy underly-
ing [the federal securities] laws." 65
This suggestion has been adopted by district courts from within the
Second and Third Circuits. In Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship
Co.,6 6 the lower court held that even though the defendant was guilty
of mere negligence in a violation of Section 14(a) of the 1933 Act, im-
plied indemnity would be contrary to the policy of the securities laws,
63. Id. at 708.
64. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Premier Corp. v. Economic
Research Analysts, Inc., 578 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1978); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251
(D. Del. 1978); Odette v. Shearson, Hammil Co., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Altman
v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
65. Kroll, Some Rflections on Indemnfcation Provisions, Etc., 24 Bus. LAW. 681, 692 (1969);
accord, Comment, Indemnffcation of Underwriters and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 72
YALE L.J. 406 (1962).
66. 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated and remanded, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). The
appellate court did not express a view on the indemnity issue.
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regardless of whether the indemnitor was guilty of intentional fraud or
bore a greater responsibility for the violation.67 The court stated:
[S]ection 14(a) reaches negligent as well as deliberately deceptive
conduct, and the considerations governing indemnity thereunder are,
accordingly somewhat different.
It is well established that the purpose of Section 14(a) is regulatory,
not compensatory. . . . Thus, the question of who pays the damages
to the plaintiffs is of as great concern as the issue of whether the
plaintiffs are to be compensated at all. To allow indemnity to those
who have breached responsibilities squarely placed upon them by the
statute would vitiate remedial purposes under §14(a). Only a realis-
tic possibility of liability for damages will encourage due diligence by
those who solicit proxies and will protect the interest of informed
corporate suffrage. 68
Gould was relied upon in Odette v. Shearson, Hammil & Co.,69 in
which a brokerage firm was sued under various provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts, and cross-complained against a bank for implied in-
demnity. Liability under most of the provisions required a finding of
either actual knowledge of the misrepresentation or reckless disregard
of their truth or falsity, but one provision, Section 12(2) of the 1933
Act, required only a finding of negligence. The court concluded that
the public policy factors expressed in Globus should be broadly inter-
preted to prohibit indemnification for negligent as well as knowing
misconduct, and expressly distinguished the case at bar from a situa-
tion in which a defendant was held vicariously liable without fault. 0
E. Right of Contribution
The right of an intentional or negligent wrongdoer to obtain contribu-
tion (as opposed to indemnffcation)7 t from a joint tortfeasor is specifi-
cally recognized by both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.72 The right to
contribution under those circumstances which precludes indemnifica-
tion has been stated to be a useful method of allocating the damages
fairly among all the wrongdoers without absolving one at the expense
of another, and is considered to be in furtherance of the deterrent pur-
poses of the securities laws.73
67. 387 F. Supp. at 167.
68. Id. at 167-68.
69. 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
70. Id. at 956-57.
71. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts §50 (8th ed. 1974).
72. This right may be found in Section 1l(f) of the 1933 Act and Sections 9(e) and 18(b) of
the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§77k(f), 78i(e), 78r(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
73. See McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1265-68 (D. Del. 1978).
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CONCLUSION
The assertion of this defense by an insurer should not encounter the
traditional tendency of the courts to provide coverage in doubtful situa-
tions or the reluctance of the courts to accept insurance company de-
fenses based on the alleged participation of the insured in the fraud as
illustrated in a number of well known cases.74 It must be observed that
in each of those cases, the defense involved questions offact which
could be and which were resolved in favor of coverage. The defense
discussed in this article, on the other hand, is a purely legal defense, the
viability of which should not depend in any way upon the underlying
facts of the case. The insurer's defense asserts that, since the insured's
liability could be based only upon the knowing and culpable conduct
of the insured, coverage is excluded. The sole issue before the court is
whether, as a matter of law, the culpability and participation necessary
to render an employer liable under Section 20(a) is sufficient to pre-
clude indemnification.
A strong argument can be made that the threshold level of culpabil-
ity on the part of the insured necessary to preclude indemnification is
significantly lower in the context of federal securities law than in the
context of other types of fraud. For example, it is well settled that mere
negligence of the insured in permitting employee fraud is no defense to
the insurer.75 Yet it has been held that negligence of an indemnitee will
preclude indemnification where the negligence involved the violation
of federal securities law, irrespective of the degree of knowledge or par-
ticipation of the indemnitor.7 6 These holdings, which are extensions of
the Globus decision, are based upon the public policies underlying the
federal securities laws. Reason dictates that similar holdings in cases
seeking indemnity should also be based upon the principle that an in-
sured cannot recover from its carrier for loss sustained because of its
own wilful misconduct. It has frequently been stated that the primary
purpose of this statutory scheme is deterrence, and that its remedial
aspects, which are largely the product of expansive judicial interpreta-
tion, are of only secondary importance.77
The current judicial skepticism toward some insurance coverage de-
fenses would thus come into direct conflict with the deterrent policies of
the federal securities laws in the context of a suit seeking indemnity for
74. See, e.g., FDIC v. Lott, 460 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1972); General Fin. Corp. v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 439 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1971).
75. Arlington Trust Co., Inc. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 854, 858 (E.D. Va.
1969).
76. Odette v. Shearson, Hammnill & Co. 394 F. Supp. 946, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
77. See generall, Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
ajfd inpart and rep'd inpart, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
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liability resulting from a violation of these laws. There should be no
such skepticism and the deterrent policies should be acknowledged and
given effect. The Globus line of decisions indicates that the policies
underlying the securities laws would prevail where the liability of the
insured to the third party was based on a degree of fault greater than
mere negligence, and that such policies might also prevail even where
such liability is based on negligence alone. It is clear that the liability
of an employer (other than a broker-dealer), as an exclusive forum for
a violation of Rule lOb-5 or any provision of the 1934 Act, must be
based on a degree of fault greater than negligence. A loss resulting
from such liability should not be compensable under any form of
fidelity bond or indemnity insurance agreement. Sound arguments can
be made that a similar result should obtain with respect to liability
under the 1933 Act.78 The ultimate resolution of the inclusive-exclu-
sive split by the United States Supreme Court should determine
whether any such employer can insure itself against a loss resulting
from a federal securities law violation in any jurisdiction.
78. See note 13 supra.
